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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WILLIAM J. CHEVRE, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 981375-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a 
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the police 
officer, who was following defendant down a hill and who observed 
a malfunctioning brake light on defendant's tractor trailer, had 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant? 
xx[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness!.]" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994) . This standard, however, ''conveys a measure 
of discretion to the trial judge," falling short of a de novo 
review. Id. 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the scope of 
the stop was justified beyond its original purpose where the 
officer observed that the driver of the tractor trailer was so 
nervous that his foot clattered noticeably against the brake 
pedal, he was unable to coherently answer even simple questions, 
and he exhibited a significant physical disability? 
3. Was the officer's search of the sleeper area of the 
tractor trailer, conducted immediately after defendant's arrest 
for driving under the influence of a central nervous system 
stimulant, justified as a search incident to arrest? 
The standard of review articulated in State v. Pena, above, 
also applies to these issues. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a traffic stop near Kanab in July of 1995, 
defendant was charged with one count each of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance (over 100 pounds of marijuana), a 
second degree felony; driving under the influence of drugs, a 
class B misdemeanor; possession of more than one commercial 
driver's license, a class C misdemeanor; falsifying a log book, a 
class C misdemeanor; and driving with a defective stop light, a 
class C misdemeanor (R. 18-20). 
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant 
over on all charges except falsifying a log book (R. 16-17). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress (R. 24-25, 28-29). 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion, entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to support its ruling (R. 100-01, 103-08 or addendum A). 
Defendant then entered a conditional plea agreement, in which he 
pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance 
(more than one pound of marijuana), a third degree felony, in 
exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining misdemeanor 
charges (R. 115-19). The court then entered a conviction on the 
felony and eventually sentenced defendant to zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 121-22, 142-43). Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal (R. 124). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Utah Highway Patrol trooper Stanley Fox, assigned to the 
state safety inspection program, was patrolling eastbound out of 
Kanab when defendant passed him driving a tractor trailer in the 
opposite direction (R. 131: 8, 10, 11). Fox noticed that in 
addition to the driver, a passenger was also seated in the front 
seat (Id. at 11). Fox reversed directions "because [he] saw the 
driver and a co-driver, both seated in the front seats, which 
would require . . . the co-driver to have his log book current to 
the last change of duty status" (Id. at 12). While following 
the vehicle and looking for a suitable place to pull it over to 
check the log book, Fox noticed that the left rear brake light on 
the trailer was not functioning (Id. at 12, 77) .l Both to check 
the log book and to inform defendant of the equipment 
malfunction, Trooper Fox activated his lights and stopped 
defendant (Id. at 21, 78). 
Trooper Fox approached defendant and asked to see his log 
book and registration permits (Id. at 13). He also asked where 
defendant was going, where he had been, and what he was hauling 
(Id. at 13-14). Describing defendant's response to this 
encounter, Fox stated: "He - in answering the questions that I 
asked him, while he was looking for his documents and so forth, 
1
 Trooper Fox noticed the brake light malfunction when 
defendant applied the brakes going downhill in front of him (R. 
131 at 20, 78). 
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he was quite broken in his answers. They seemed to be, ah, not 
really answers to the questions I was asking him or the things 
that I was asking him for" (Id. at 13). Characterizing 
defendant's behavior as "strange" and "spacey," Fox observed 
"[t]he inability to carry on a good conversation, the cotton 
mouth, dry lips, dry mouth, his very nervous condition, his foot 
was - was virtually bouncin' off the floor while he was seated in 
the vehicle. It was - in fact, I remember it clattering against 
the brake pedal and fuel feed.' . . ." (Id. at 17; 45). Fox also 
noticed that defendant's left arm was "kind of unresponsive . . . 
almost limp. There seemed to be a physical defect there of some 
type" (Id^ at 14). 
After some searching, defendant produced the requested 
documentation. Trooper Fox then asked defendant to get out of 
his vehicle so that he could point out the defective brake light 
as well as a leaking axle seal he had later noticed (Id. at 15, 
16, 79). The pair then walked back to the trooper's vehicle to 
review the log book. 
The log book stated that defendant was traveling from the 
Flagstaff/Grey Mountain area. According to Trooper Fox, however, 
"[t]he period of time that had lapsed . . . was not consistent 
with the amount of time it should have taken. . . . [T]here was 
quite a bit more time there than what would have been reasonable" 
(Id. at 17-18). After some further discussion about the log 
5 
book, Fox suspected a "false fix" of the books (Id. at 71-73).2 
Based on defendant's "very nervous condition" and his 
"somewhat inconsistent answers on his whereabouts," Fox decided 
to administer a drug recognition evaluation (Id. at 17).3 Of the 
eight field tests administered, defendant exhibited significant 
difficulties on five of them (Id. at 20-35). After questioning 
defendant about the status of his health and his physical 
condition, Trooper Fox concluded that defendant was under the 
influence of a central nervous system stimulant.4 Accordingly, 
he arrested defendant for driving under the influence (Id. at 37-
38) . 
Fox also learned from defendant that the passenger, whom 
defendant identified as Mike Hobbs, was not a co-driver (Id. at 
43). Defendant stated that he had known Hobbs for six months, 
and that he had picked him up in Tucson on the 16th of the month 
(Id. at 44). Trooper Fox then approached the passenger, who was 
still seated in the stopped vehicle. In response to Fox's 
questions, the passenger identified himself as Carlos Gracia and 
told Fox that he barely knew defendant, having only hitched a 
ride with him the night before, which was the 17th of the month 
(Id. at 45-46). It is unclear from the record, however, exactly 
when in the sequence of events Fox received this conflicting 
information. 
3
 Trooper Fox had previously noted the physical disability 
associated with defendant's left arm. When he told defendant 
that he would be undergoing field tests for drugs, defendant 
complained that he couldn't do so because of his disability (Id. 
at 28, 38). Fox took defendant's physical limitations into 
consideration by focusing his assessment on the unaffected side 
of defendant's body (IdL. at 34-37). 
4
 At the time of this incident, Trooper Fox had completed 
the coursework to become a drug recognition evaluator, although 
he had not yet been certified (Id. at 21) . 
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A few minutes later, Trooper Fox returned to the cab of the 
tractor trailer. Entering the cab, he opened the curtains 
dividing the driving area from the sleeping area of the vehicle. 
Fox testified that he "saw some large things underneath some 
blankets and to make sure they weren't people, I uncovered them" 
(Id. at 40). By so doing, he exposed "a large bundle . . . about 
maybe two feet long and maybe a foot and a half in diameter . . . 
the shape of a miniature hay bale. It was wrapped in a plastic 
contact paper, something similar to what you would line cupboards 
with or drawers with in your home" (Id. at 41). Based on his 
training, Fox assumed that the packaging contained marijuana 
(Id.). He tore back a corner of the bundle, exposing a green 
leafy substance inside (Id. at 42). 
Ultimately, thirty-three bales of marijuana, weighing just 
over 350 pounds, were removed from the sleeper area of 
defendant's tractor trailer (Id. at 49, 70). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the Trooper Fox was not 
justified in initially stopping his vehicle. Fox, however, had 
observed an equipment malfunction on defendant's tractor trailer 
prior to effectuating the stop. That personal observation 
justified the stop. 
Second, defendant argues that Fox impermissibly expanded the 
scope of the stop by extending it beyond the time necessary to 
7 
cite defendant for the equipment violation. However, when Fox 
first approached defendant and engaged him in conversation, Fox 
observed that defendant was unable to answer even simple 
questions coherently, was so nervous that his foot noticeably 
clattered against the brake pedal, and exhibited a significant 
physical disability of one arm. The trooper detained defendant 
just long enough to determine, through a series of field tests, 
whether defendant was driving under the influence of a central 
nervous system stimulant. Fox's reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was impaired justified the limited expansion of the 
scope of the stop. 
Finally, defendant argues that, after he had been arrested, 
Fox impermissibly searched the passenger compartment of the 
tractor trailer. This search, however, is most easily justified 
as a search incident to arrest because the arrest was lawful, the 
passenger compartment was within defendant's area of immediate 
control, and because the search was contemporaneous with the 
arrest. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT'S 
TRACTOR TRAILER WAS JUSTIFIED WHERE 
A SAFETY INSPECTION OFFICER, 
FOLLOWING DEFENDANT DOWN A HILL, 
OBSERVED A MALFUNCTIONING BRAKE 
LIGHT PRIOR TO EFFECTUATING THE 
STOP 
Defendant articulates the issue before the Court as follows: 
"Having determined to stop the vehicle on fallacious grounds, is 
an after observed mechanical defect justification for an officer 
to stop a vehicle?" (Br. of App. at 7). The simple answer to 
this question is "yes." That is, even if an officer intends to 
stop a vehicle for a reason unsupported by the law5 and then, 
prior to effectuating the stop, observes a violation that would 
legally justify the stop, he is not precluded by his original 
misjudgment from making the stop. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1140 (Utah 1994)(rejecting pretext doctrine and observing 
that "*it is irrelevant what else the officer knew or suspected 
about the traffic violator at the time of the stop.'" (citation 
omitted)). 
A traffic stop is justified at its inception if the stop is 
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's 
The State does not concede that a log book violation 
cannot justify a stop, but simply argues that the Court need not 
reach the question where the officer personally observed a safety 
equipment malfunction. 
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presence." Id. at 1131 (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 
491 (Utah App. 1990)). Indeed, whenever a police officer 
personally observes a traffic offense, no matter how minor, the 
officer is justified in stopping the driver of the vehicle. 
State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224-25 (Utah App. 1995); Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1132. 
In this case, regardless of whether Trooper Fox's desire to 
check defendant's log book justified the stop, his observation of 
a brake light malfunction would nonetheless independently suffice 
to justify it. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(a) (articulating 
requirement for brake lights); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah 1990) (vehicle stop justified where officer believed 
vehicle safety equipment not functioning properly). Fox 
testified that, as he was following defendant's tractor trailer 
down a hill, defendant applied the brakes, and the trooper 
noticed that "there were no lights on the left side" (R. 130 at 
21) .6 This observation alone would justify the stop, regardless 
of any other bases that may have been available. Cf. Spuraeon, 
904 P.2d at 225 (two separate traffic violations each provided 
6
 Defendant argues that the brake light malfunction cannot 
serve as a justification for stopping him because the officer 
initially reversed directions and followed him with an improper 
intent. Peace officers, however, can freely move about on the 
roads without any justification, so long as their stops are based 
either on observed traffic violations or on reasonable 
articulable suspicion. State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 n.3 
(Utah App. 1995)(citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (Utah 1994)). 
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independent justification for stop). Consequently, defendant's 
argument that the initial stop of his vehicle was unjustified 
must fail. 
POINT TWO 
THE SCOPE OF THE STOP WAS JUSTIFIED 
WHERE THE OFFICER OBSERVED THAT THE 
DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WAS 
EXTREMELY NERVOUS, EXHIBITED A 
SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL DISABILITY, 
AND WAS UNABLE TO COHERENTLY ANSWER 
EVEN SIMPLE QUESTIONS 
Defendant argues that after the officer showed him the 
defective brake light, the stop should have been terminated. 
That is, the officer would have been justified in citing him for 
the defective brake light, but had no reason to extend the scope 
of the stop beyond the time necessary to issue such a citation 
(Br. of App. at 8, 12). 
When an officer stops a vehicle, the resulting detention 
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 4 60 U.S. 
491, 500 (1983) . Any investigative questioning that detains the 
driver beyond the original purposes of the stop "must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity" and "must be based on specific, articulable facts drawn 
from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the 
time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, even if the officer has such reasonable suspicion, 
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the officer must "diligently [pursue] a means of investigation 
that [is] likely to confirm or dispel [the officer's] suspicions 
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the 
defendant." State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 
1991)(citation omitted). 
In this case, by the time Trooper Fox had shown defendant 
the defective brake light, he had also noticed defendant's 
"strange, spacey" behavior, his limp left arm, his bouncing foot, 
and his inability to respond to simple, direct questions (R. 131 
at 13-15, 45). Based on these specific facts, Fox reasonably 
suspected either that defendant was operating his tractor trailer 
under the influence of drugs or that he was impaired by a medical 
condition. Consequently, before permitting defendant to get back 
on the highway behind the wheel of a tractor trailer, the officer 
was justified in further investigating defendant's condition. 
See generally Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 
841, 848 (1st Cir. 1997)(discussing policy that "persons who are 
under the influence of narcotics or other intoxicants should not 
be permitted to operate commercial vehicles on public highways"). 
To confirm or dispel his suspicions of possible drug use, 
Trooper Fox extended the detention long enough to administer a 
drug recognition evaluation (R. 131 at 17). Indeed, a series of 
field tests, under the facts here, presented the quickest way to 
determine if the officer's suspicions were well-founded. Based 
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on the results of the tests, and after ascertaining that 
defendant was not in need of medical care or taking any 
prescribed drugs, Trooper Fox concluded that defendant was 
functioning under the influence of a central nervous system 
stimulant (Id. at 80, 83-84). 
The totality of the circumstances thus demonstrates that 
Trooper Fox extended the detention beyond the scope of the 
original stop in order to determine in the most expeditious way 
possible whether or not defendant was operating a vehicle under 
the influence of drugs. Defendant's argument that the scope of 
the detention was unjustified, therefore, must fail. 
POINT THREE 
TROOPER FOX'S SEARCH OF THE SLEEPER 
COMPARTMENT WAS JUSTIFIED AS A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Defendant contends that even if Trooper Fox reasonably 
believed that defendant was under the influence of a CNS 
stimulant, that belief alone, absent exigent circumstances, 
cannot justify the officer's search for drugs in the tractor 
trailer's sleeper compartment (Br. of App. at 14-15). Further, 
he argues, the search cannot be sustained as an impound inventory 
search. Consequently, he argues, the evidence found in the 
sleeper should be suppressed. 
The law is well-settled that a reviewing court "can affirm 
the trial court on any proper legal ground," even if that ground 
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was not argued before the lower court. State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 
987, 988 (Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted). In this case, the 
officer's search of the sleeper compartment may be justified as a 
search incident to arrest.7 
An arresting officer may conduct a warrantless search 
incident to arrest of both an arrestee and the area within the 
arrestee's immediate control if: 1) the arrest is lawful; 2) the 
search is confined to the area over which the arrestee has 
immediate control; and 3) the search is conducted 
contemporaneously with the arrest, New York v. Belton, 4 53 U.S. 
454, 460 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64 
(1969). The purpose of such a search is limited to preventing 
the arrestee from gaining control over a weapon or from 
destroying evidence of a crime. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; accord 
7
 In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
supporting its denial of defendant's suppression motion, the 
trial court concluded that "it was reasonable for Trooper Fox to 
return to the tractor to perform an inventory search of the 
tractor" (R. 104 or addendum A). The record reflects that: 
impounding the vehicle was proper because the passenger was not 
certified to drive a tractor trailer; the Highway Patrol has 
written policies and procedures for conducting impound 
inventories; and Trooper Fox was engaged in an inventory when he 
looked in the cab (R. 40, 43, 90). This limited record evidence 
provides thin support for the trial court's determination. See 
State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 988-90 (Utah App. 1992) 
(discussing need for evidence to support finding that officer 
acted in compliance with established departmental policies for 
conducting impound inventory searches and affirming in case where 
such evidence was "admittedly thin"). Consequently, the State 
offers a stronger alternative ground upon which to affirm, should 
the Court find the record too bare to support an impound 
inventory search. 
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State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, all three elements of a search incident to 
arrest have been fulfilled. First, as has been explained in 
Points I and II, the arrest was lawful. The brake light 
malfunction justified the initial stop of defendant's tractor-
trailer. Once defendant had been stopped and the officer 
observed his peculiar behavior, the officer expanded the scope of 
the stop just enough to determine, through easily-administered 
field tests, that defendant was under the influence of a central 
nervous system stimulant or had an unknown medical condition. 
After defendant himself eliminated a medical explanation for his 
behavior, the officer lawfully arrested him for driving under the 
influence of a CNS stimulant. 
Second, the search was limited to an area over which 
defendant had immediate control, as both federal and state 
appellate courts have interpreted that phrase. The United States 
Supreme Court has construed "immediate control" to mean "the area 
from within which [a suspect] might gain possession of a weapon 
or destructible evidence." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
Establishing a bright line test, the Court subsequently ruled 
that when a vehicle stop is involved, the area of immediate 
control includes the passenger compartment. New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. at 4 60. Further, the area of immediate control "can 
extend to a closed container left in the passenger area of a car, 
15 
even after the arrestee has been moved away from the car." State 
v, Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Belton, 
453 U.S. at 461), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). In 
essence, every person arrested is viewed "as a combination 
acrobat and Houdini who might well free himself from his 
restraints and suddenly gain access to some distant place." 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.3(c), at 628 (1987). 
In this case, the passenger compartment of the tractor 
trailer contained two areas, one for driving and one for 
sleeping, separated only by a curtain (R. 40). Because both 
areas were contiguous to each other and equally accessible, 
defendant or his passenger could as easily have destroyed 
evidence or secured a weapon from one area as the other. 
Consequently, in order to effectuate the purpose of a search 
incident to arrest, the officer's right to search the passenger 
compartment must encompass the right to search both the driving 
area and the sleeping area.8 See State v. Johnson, 892 P.2d 106, 
108-09 (Wash. App. 1995) (passenger compartment of tractor 
trailer includes sleeping area of cab reachable without exiting 
8
 When the officer "saw some large things underneath some 
blankets," he uncovered them in order to make sure the "things" 
were not people (R. 131:40). Plainly, he did so for his own 
safety. When he found bales wrapped in contact paper, he knew 
from his training and experience that they likely contained 
marijuana (Id. at 41-42, 92-93). These actions plainly fell 
within the ambit of a search incident to arrest. See, e.g., 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461. 
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the cab); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at 450-
51 (3rd ed. 1996) (passenger compartment should be construed as 
including all space that can be reached without exiting the 
vehicle). 
Finally, the evidence is undisputed that the search of the 
vehicle occurred minutes after defendant had been arrested and, 
indeed, before the passenger was arrested (R. 39, 42).9 
The facts in this case thus demonstrably fulfill all the 
requirements of a search incident to arrest. Consequently, this 
Court can sustain the search on that basis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j ^ day of August, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
9
 The passenger, then, was not constrained from accessing 
the passenger compartment and whatever it might contain. 
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ADDENDUM A 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) 
) Case No. 951600068 
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE, ) 
) JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995, 
pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Suppress. The State of Utah 
was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney. 
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R. 
Scarth. The parties presented evidence and argued their 
respective positions. Counsel then requested that they be 
allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. On November 22, 1996, the matter came 
before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the 
STATE OF UTAH v. WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRB 
CASE NO. 951600068 
1 
Court's decision. The Court, having heard the testimony, having 
reviewed the parties1 memoranda, and having heard the arguments 
of counsel, now therefore enters the following: 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1." On July 18, 1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox 
pulled over a westbound tractor trailer on U.S. Highway 8 9 in 
Kanab, Utah. 
2. The tractor was being driven by the Defendant, and the 
only other occupant was an adult male in the passenger seat. 
3. Trooper Fox was accompanied by State Safety Inspector 
David Shiers. 
4. Trooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to 
check the driver's log book. 
5. As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull 
over the tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on 
the trailer. 
6. Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the 
driver's log book and conduct a mechanical inspection. 
7. Once Trooper Fox made the stop, he talked to the 
Defendant, and noticed that the Defendant was "prettyff nervous, 
that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive, and that the 
Defendant seemed to have a physical defect of some type. Trooper 
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Fox noticed that the Defendant's foot "was virtually bouncin' off 
the floor.11 
8. Trooper Fox began to ask the Defendant questions 
relating to his log book and permits. 
9. Trooper Fox observed the Defendant's extreme nervous 
condition, his inability to carry on a decent conversation, his 
cotton mouth or dry mouth, and his continual licking of his lips. 
10. Trooper Fox asked the Defendant to get out of the 
tractor to show him the inoperable brake light, and a leaking oil 
seal, and to review the log book and have more discussion. 
11. Once Trooper Fox had the Defendant in his patrol 
vehicle, he asked the Defendant to perform some drug recognition 
tests for the following reasons: inability to carry on a 
conversation, cotton mouth, dry lips, very nervous condition, and 
somewhat inconsistent answers regarding his whereabouts. 
12. The Defendant complied, and performed some of the drug 
recognition tests. 
13. At the time, although Trooper Fox had completed a drug 
recognition course, he did not hold a drug recognition 
evaluator!s certificate because copies of the evaluations he had 
performed as part of his training had not been sent in to the 
instructors, and because he had not yet sent in a resume. 
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14. Based on his training and the drug recognition 
evaluation, Trooper Fox determined that the Defendant was under 
the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. 
15. Trooper Fox then placed the Defendant under arrest for 
driving under the influence of drugs. 
16. After placing the Defendant under arrest, Trooper Fox 
opened and looked into the trailer. 
17. The passenger did not have a commercial driver's 
license. 
18. Trooper Fox then returned to the tractor to search for 
a central nervous stimulant and to conduct an inventory search, 
because the truck was going to be impounded. 
19. Upon returning to the tractor, Trooper Fox opened the 
curtain to the sleeper area, saw something large under some 
blankets, and removed the blankets, all to ensure that no one was 
in the sleeper area. 
20. Instead of finding a person, Trooper Fox found several 
large bundles wrapped in contact paper. 
21. Trooper Fox tore open the corner of one bundle, having 
assumed the contents to be marijuana, based on training he had 
received. 
22. Ultimately, the bundles were weighed, and found to 
contain 159.04 kilograms (350.6 pounds) of marijuana. 
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The initial stop of the tractor trailer was legitimate 
because of the defective brake light on the trailer. Trooper 
Fox's decision to stop the tractor trailer to examine the 
driver's log book, which was made prior to the discovery of the 
defective brake light, does not adversely affect the legitimacy 
of the stop. 
2. Based on Defendant's noted physical characteristics 
while Trooper Fox was at the tractor door, i.e., Defendant's 
nervous condition, his "kinda" unresponsive arm, his bouncing 
foot, his inability to carry on a conversation, his cotton mouth 
or dry mouth, the continual licking of his lips, and his 
inconsistent answers about his whereabouts, Trooper Fox was 
justified in asking Defendant out of the tractor, and was 
justified in having Defendant perform the drug recognition tests. 
3. After Defendant was arrested for driving under the 
influence of a central nervous stimulant, it was reasonable for 
Trooper Fox to return to the tractor to perform an inventory 
search of the tractor. 
4. It was reasonable for Trooper Fox to open the curtain 
to the tractor's sleeper area, and to remove the blankets to 
ensure that no one was under them. 
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5. Based on Trooper Fox's training, it was reasonable for 
him to tear the corner of one of the bundles to examine the 
contents. 
DATED this Mttt day of November, 1997-. 
BY THE COURT: 
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